

NSC BRIEFING

7 December 1954

COMMUNIST REACTION TO TAIPEI PACT

I. Chinese Communist propaganda is furious in denouncing US-Nationalist security pact.

- A. Little doubt that Peiping is genuinely opposed to this formalization of existing US commitment to defend Formosa and Pescadores.
- B. However, Peiping was not surprised by 1 December announcement that negotiations on pact completed.
- C. For weeks Peiping had been decrying projected pact in same terms used to condemn it since 1 December.

II. Main lines of Peiping's attack on pact, before and after 1 December, assert that:

- A. US plans prolong its "occupation" of Formosa indefinitely.
- B. US intends prevent "Chinese people" from "liberating" their own territory, which means "direct military interference" in Chinese internal affairs. (Moscow has echoed this line.)
- C. Treaty is a "war treaty," a "war provocation," one of many US "acts of war" against Peiping.
- D. Pact indicates US preparations for aggression against Chinese mainland. (Peiping refuses admit that pact is purely defensive.)

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E. Pact will "increase tension" in Far East,
threaten peace and security of area.

III. Peiping has emphasized US "responsibility" for pact's
"serious consequences."

A. Strongest statement before 1 December was
assertion--at World Peace Congress--that US
would be responsible "should an overall conflict
in Far East be provoked" by this type of "inter-
ference."

B. Since then, strongest statement is Chou's
assertion (5 December) that pact presents "danger
of a new war."

IV. These threats are coupled with emphatic reaffirmations
Peiping's intent to "liberate" Formosa regardless of US.

A. Chou echoed many other spokesmen when he said
(5 December) Peiping is "determined to liberate"
Formosa.

B. Moscow has repeated such Chinese statements.

C. However, both parties careful not to set any dead-
line for "liberation."

D. Peiping evidently believes that extended period
of preparation is necessary before operation can
be launched.

E. Thus we do not expect Chinese Communists will
attempt to invade Formosa this winter, although

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- V. Peiping probably disappointed by treaty's failure to clarify specific US intentions toward offshore islands.
 - A. Chinese Communists remain capable of taking any of these islands against Nationalists alone.
 - B. Current Communist program seems one of harassment, aimed at inducing Nationalists to withdraw.
 - C. If this unsuccessful, strong chance that Communists will risk invasion of one of major island groups next year.
- VI. In meantime, Peiping is clearly attempting to isolate US on issue of support for Nationalist China.
 - A. Comment on pact has appealed to "all countries" to be alert both to US efforts to "torpedo peace" and to US preparations for "new aggressive wars."
 - B. In this connection, Peiping has been bitter about British "attitude of support" for US position.
 - C. Peiping's policy toward Formosa next year may well depend on results of such attempts to isolate US.
 - D. Should Communists feel US isolated, they would be much more likely to risk invasion attempt.
 - E. In sum, Formosa situation remains explosive and must be continually reassessed.